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We develop a two-sector, two-country model where trade is driven by technological 
differences. Each country is populated by large number of heterogeneous workers 
distinguished by their level of skills. Given that one country has a technological advantage in 
the skilled intensive good when we allow for both trade and migration skilled workers migrate 
to that country. We analyze the consequences of this migration for both inequality and 
welfare for the source and the host country. 
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For all the public concern with unskilled immigration, it is notable that a sizable share
of immigration involves people that are skilled￿ relative to both the home and host coun-
try labor markets (Docquier & Marfouk 2006, Defoort & Rodgers 2008). While such
migrations have long been a staple of the literature on the "brain drain" (e.g. Grubel &
Scott 1966, Bhagwati & Rodriguez 1975, Kwok & Leland 1982, Commander, Kangasniemi
& Winters 2004, Kapur & McHale 2005), the focus of research on host countries has pri-
marily been unskilled migration (Ethier 1986). Furthermore, most of this literature has
emphasized single-country analysis, not the global equilibrium of such ￿ ows. Similarly,
most of this literature tends to consider economies that are closed to all global ￿ ows but
migration (or small, open economies with relative prices ￿xed by international trade).
This was a sensible research strategy in an era characterized by high trade restrictions
in North-South trade, but it seems problematic in an increasingly globalized world where
international trade constitutes a sizable share of world product. In addition, as long as
trade and factor movements take place between countries with democratically elected gov-
ernments we also need to distinguish welfare outcomes from outcomes that are politically
feasible.
To address these issues, we introduce migration of skilled workers in a two-country, two-
sector trade model. As in the Roy selection model (Roy 1951), workers in both countries
are di⁄erentiated by skill and, in autarky or under trade (but without migration), they will
sort themselves among sectors based on the sector that o⁄ers the higher income.1 As in
the Roy-Borjas model (Borjas 1987), when presented with the opportunity to migrate, they
will choose whether or not to migrate based on comparison of incomes net of migration
costs.2 It is well-known that in models of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson type trade
and migration are substitutes (Mundell 1957, Markusen 1983, Ethier 1996). In line with
much of the recent literature on migration, we will assume that there is a technology gap
between countries.3 Speci￿cally, while the two countries use the same technology in the
primary sector, one country has a more e¢ cient technology in the high-tech sector. The
two countries have identical endowments of skills (human capital). In the primary sector
worker productivity is independent of the level of skills. Skills however matter in the
high-tech sector.
1Bougheas & Riezman (2007), Davidson & Matusz (2006) and Davidson, Matusz & Nelson (2006) use
the same framework to analyze a host of trade issues, but not migration.
2The Roy-Borjas model has proved to be an extremely useful framework for organizing both theoretical
and empirical work on migration (e.g. Chiquiar & Hanson 2005, Brucker & Defoort 2006, Belot & Hatton
2008, Grogger & Hanson 2008, Ortega & Peri 2009). It is notable that all of the papers just cited ￿nd
support for positive selection.
3In his Marshall lecture, Lucas (1988, pg. 38) noted in passing that patterns of immigration seem
inconsistent with patterns of capital ￿ ow in standard growth model. Davis & Weinstein (2002) and
Iranzo & Peri (2009) build models of trade and migration with technological di⁄erences in which the
technologically superior country not only exports the skilled labor-intensive good, but also imports skilled
labor. Building on the same empirical observation, Rauch (1991) develops an alternative model with
heterogeneous workers in which production requires managerial labor as well as skilled and unskilled
labor, only skilled workers ban be managers. Rauch￿ s model also generates the observed patterns of
mobility and trade.
2After we derive the equilibrium under autarky for each country, we solve for the free
trade equilibrium. Next, we do not allow trade but we permit migration. When migration
is costless we arrive at a full integration equilibrium where everybody lives in the country
that is technologically superior. We also derive the equilibrium when migration is costly
and we ￿nd that when only skilled workers move the gap between the autarky prices widens.
The intuition is that as skilled workers move away from the country that is technologically
disadvantaged it increases the relative cost of producing the high tech-good and thus
increases its relative price which in turn deteriorates the incomes of the producers of the
primary commodity who also are the relatively poor. Migration has exactly the opposite
e⁄ects on the technologically advanced country.
When we allow for both trade and migration we derive two main results. The ￿rst
is that trade and migration are complements. Put di⁄erently, migration is higher under
trade than under autarky. The second result is that welfare is higher when both trade and
migration are allowed. More importantly, when we consider separately migrants, and the
citizens of each country without including the migrants we ￿nd that migration and trade
increase the welfare of each of these three groups.
Finally, we turn to the political economy implications of our model. When citizens are
allowed to vote for whether or not to allow migration and on whether or not to compensate
those who lose as a consequence of migration we ￿nd that the sequence of referenda in
the source country and the citizenship status of migrants in the host country can both
matter. There is now a sizable literature developing on the political economy of migration.4
In an important early contribution, Benhabib (1996) developed a small, open, one-sector
economy with heterogeneous agents (every agent possesses one unit of labor and some non-
negative quantity of capital), where migration policy is decided by referendum. Grether,
DeMelo & M￿ller (2001) drop the agent heterogeneity, but consider a small, open, 2-
sector economy, with a referendum mechanism. In our analysis, we model a large, 2-
sector economy with heterogeneous agents. In our 2-country world, we can follow the
literature on selection, while still retaining the tractability to present a simple intuitive
model permitting welfare and political economy issues.
2. The Model
There are two countries A and B each populated by a continuum of workers of unit
measure. Each worker is endowed with one unit of indivisible labor and some level of
human capital h. In both countries human capital is uniformly distributed on the interval
[0;1]. In each country there are two competitive sectors. Sector X produces a high-
tech product while sector Y produces a primary commodity. The productivity of workers
depends on their level of human capital and their sector of employment. Let zAX(h) denote
the productivity of a worker with human capital h who works in country A in sector X
4Much of this literature deals with the way redistributive policy interacts with migration (e.g. Mazza
& Van Winden 1996, Wellisch & Walsz 1998, Razin, Sadka & Swagel 2002). That is not the focus of our
paper, and we will not comment on it any further. Similarly, a number of papers have used lobbying models
toanalyze the political economy of immigration (e.g. Facchini & Willmann 2005, Epstein & Nitzan 2006).
As our paper focuses on the referendum mechanism, we will not discuss these papers either.
3(other types of employment are similarly de￿ned). All four technologies are linear in h:
zAX = h
zBX = kh; k > 1
zAY = zBY = v; 0 < v < 1;
Both countries use the same technology to produce the primary commodity but country B
has a superior technology in sector X. In addition, the marginal return to human capital
is higher in the high-tech sector.
All workers have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences given by
U = X
￿Y
￿; 0 < ￿;￿ < 1; ￿ + ￿ = 1
Given that technologies are CRS and that all markets are competitive worker incomes
equal their productivities and each workers spend a fraction ￿ of her income on product
X.
2.1. Autarky
Throughout we use good X as the numeraire and let pA and pB denote the autarky prices
in countries A and B respectively. In what follows we are going to concentrate our analysis
on country B since by setting k = 1 we can obtain the corresponding solutions for country
A.
Workers choose their sector of employment by comparing wages. A worker with human
capital h will receive income kh if employed in sector X while the same worker will receive
income pBv if employed in sector Y . This implies that all workers with human capital
higher than hB ￿
pBv
k will be employed in the high-tech sector while workers with human
capital below this threshold will be employed in the primary sector. Given our speci￿ca-
tion of preferences the equilibrium autarky price is proportional to the ratio of aggregate















Notice that the above solution implies that pB > pA which follows from the fact that
country B has a superior technology for producing the high-tech product. It also follows
that hA = hB.
￿ Figure 1 about here￿
4We illustrate the autarky equilibrium in ￿gure 1. The horizontal axis shows the (uni-
form) distribution of skill from 0 to 1. The left vertical axis shows value marginal product
in Y, while the right vertical axis shows value marginal product in X (the numeraire).
Since both countries share the same distribution of skill, both can be shown on the same
graph. Our assumptions imply that the value marginal product curve for X in country B
lies above that in country A. Finally, we see both pB > pA and hA = hB (which we simply
denote h in the diagram).
2.2. Trade
When the two economies trade country A exports the primary commodity Y and country
B exports the high-tech product X. The world price pT lies between the two autarky

















A = pTv > hA = hB >
pTv
k = hT
B. The corresponding closed form solution for the









￿ Figure 2 about here￿
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium with trade. With a common world price, we
see country B specializing in the production of good X, in which it has a comparative
advantage, by allocating more labor to its production. Similarly for country A and good
Y.
2.3. Migration
Suppose that the two economies do not trade but migration is allowed.
2.3.1. Costless Migration
Given that the two countries use the same technology to produce the primary commodity
but country B has a superior technology for producing the high-tech product every worker
in country A will emigrate in country B. The integration equilibrium price is equal to pB,
i.e. country B￿ s autarky price.
2.3.2. Costly migration
Now suppose that migration entails a cost ￿ measured in numeraire units. We are going
to assume that this cost is su¢ ciently high so that workers in the primary sector do not
wish to emigrate.5 Let pM
A and pM
B denote the two new autarky prices. The utility of a
5When we introduce trade these workers will not have an incentive to emigrate. Thus, by restricting
their movement in the absence of trade allows for clearer comparisons between the two cases.








￿￿￿.6 If the same worker emigrates to country B her new utility will


















￿￿ such that all workers with human capital above it and who
initially were citizens in country A emigrate to country B. Letting hM
A and hM
B denote
the new threshold levels of human capital that separates those employed in sector X from
those employed in sector Y , in countries A and B respectively, the new autarky prices are



























Notice that the two equations need to be solved simultaneously since hM depends on both
new autarky prices. This complication implies that it is not possible to derive closed-form
solutions for the two prices. Nevertheless, the e⁄ect of migration is to increase the gap
between the autarky prices, i.e. pM
B > pB > pA > pM
A . The intuition is that in country A
the old threshold level of human capital that separates those employed in sector X from
those employed in sector Y is too high, given that only high ability workers have migrated
while the corresponding threshold in country B is too low.7
￿ Figure 3 about here￿
While the principle is straightforward, our graphical apparatus gets messier here. Since
all workers with human capital above hA
M migrate from A to B, we truncate the A dis-
tribution at hA
M and append the ￿ skilled workers to the B distribution. It is easy to
see that, with unchaged preferences and no international trade, the migration of workers
that produce only good X results in too little X production in country A and too much
in country B. This results in an increase in the relative price of X in country A and a
reduction country B (i.e. a fall in pM
A and a rise in pM
B ) and, of course, an increase in the
allocation of labor to X production in A and to Y production in B.
6All utilities have beed divided by ￿￿￿
￿.
7Let ￿ denote the proportion of migrants. Given that both populations originally were of unit measure
the new population of country A is of measure 1 ￿ ￿ and human capital is uniformly distributed on the
interval [0;1 ￿ ￿].
63. Migration and Trade
3.1. Costless Migration
When migration is costless it is optimal that the whole production of the high-tech product
takes place in country B. In the absence of trade costs, the production location of the
primary product is inconsequential. In the presence of trade costs it is optimal that all
workers move to country B. In either case we have full integration. The full integration











k . It is clear that the equilibrium world trade price and the critical
threshold are the same as those for the autarky case for country B.
3.2. Costly Migration
Once again suppose that migration entails a cost ￿ measured in numeraire units. Given
that when the two countries trade all workers face the same price, the only workers that
move across borders are some of those workers who were citizens of country A and employed
in sector X and now move to country B and are employed in the same sector. For these
workers their pre-migration income was equal to h while their post-migration income is
equal to kh￿￿. This implies that there exists a threshold level of human capital h￿ ￿
￿
k￿1
such that all workers with human capital above it and who initially were citizens in country
A emigrate to country B.8 Letting h￿
A and h￿
B denote the new threshold levels of human
capital that separates those employed in sector X from those employed in sector Y , the




































1+k we have pB > p￿. In addition, the inequality ￿ < k ￿ 1 implies




A. This is because migration
has allowed a more e¢ cient allocation of resources by moving high skilled workers to
country B which has a superior technology for producing the skill-intensive product X.
8Notice that here it is su¢ cient to compare incomes because the prices in the two countries are equal.
Earlier we examined the case where there is no trade and therefore the prices in the two countries were
di⁄erent.
7Comparing the threshold levels of human capital that separate those who emigrate
from those who do not for the cases of migration without trade and migration with trade
we get the following result
Proposition 1 Migration and trade are complements.
Proof The proposition follows from the inequality pM
B > pM
A which ensures that h￿ < hM.
Figure 4 illustrates the equilibrium with trade and migration.
￿ Figure 4 about here￿
There is more migration under free trade and the skilled migration to the skill abun-
dant country supports increased comparative advantage based trade. The intuition is that,
under trade, prices converge which further boosts the incomes of the migrants and thus
the incentive to migrate. Of course this is not a new result. Markusen (1983) and Razin
& Sadka (1994) have, within more traditional trade modes, demonstrated the compemen-
tarity bertween trade and migration when countries di⁄er in technologies.
4. Welfare
We measure group welfare as the sum of utilities of its individual members. We are focusing
on three groups: The citizens of country B (excluding migrants), the migrants and the
citizens of country A excluding migrants. Below we demonstrate that migration increases
the welfare of all three groups and thus global welfare.9
4.1. Citizens of Country B (excluding migrants)
Those workers who were employed in the primary sector during the pre-migration period
and are still employed in the same sector during the post-migration period are better o⁄in
the later period. This is because migration increases the price of the primary commodity
and hence their income. For exactly the same reason those workers that are employed in the
high-tech sector during both periods experience a loss in utility. In addition, the inequality
h￿
B > hT
B implies that there are some workers who before migration were employed in the
high-tech sector and after migration they moved to the primary sector. Among these
workers some are better o⁄ and some are worse o⁄. More speci￿cally, there exists a
threshold level of human capital, ~ hB, such that all workers with human capital below that
level are better o⁄ after migration while all those workers with human capital above that
level are worse o⁄ after migration.
Lemma 1 Migration increases the welfare of the citizens of country B.
9All utilities have beed divided by ￿￿￿
￿. In addition, by p we denote the equilibrium price p￿ where
for notational simplicity we have dropped the superscript when confusion can be avoided..



















































































Given that ￿ < k ￿ 1 and
dp
d￿ < 0 a decrease in migration costs will increase welfare.
4.2. Migrants
Lemma 2 Migration increases the welfare of the migrants.








Substituting for pT and p￿ we ￿nd that migration increases the welfare of migrants
















The above expression is increasing in k and is equal to 1 for k = 1 which, given that
k > 1, completes the proof.
94.3. Citizens of Country A (excluding migrants)
For exactly the same reasons as those analyzed for country B, those workers who were
employed in the primary sector during the pre-migration period and are still employed in
the same sector during the post-migration period are better o⁄ in the later period. Once
more, the inequality h￿
A > hT
A implies that there are some workers who before migration
were employed in the high-tech sector and after migration they moved to the primary
sector. Among these workers some are better o⁄ and some are worse o⁄. Again, there
exists a threshold level of human capital, ~ hA, such that all workers with human capital
below that level are better o⁄ after migration while all those workers with human capital
above that level are worse o⁄ after migration.
Lemma 3 Migration increases the welfare of the citizens of country A excluding the
migrants.









































































Notice that a change in migration costs will a⁄ect the number of migrants and the
last term captures the change in welfare as a result of the change in the size of
the group. We know that a decrease in migration costs will increase the number of
migrants and we know that their welfare will increase. Here, we need to concentrate
only on the ￿rst term. Given that ￿ < k ￿1,
￿2
k￿1 < 1 and the proof is completed by
following the same steps as those used in the proof of proposition 1.
4.4. Global Welfare
The following proposition is a direct implication of the three lemmas.
Proposition 2 Migration increases global welfare.
105. Political Economy
The results of the previous section suggest that migration increases welfare in both coun-
tries even when migrants (who de￿nitely gain) are ignored. This implies that the gains
of those who bene￿t are more than su¢ cient to cover the losses of those workers who
are worse o⁄ as a result of migration. However, for counties with democratically elected
governments where majority voting decides key policy issues people might vote against
migration and even if they decide to allow it losers might not be compensated. In this
section, we identify the conditions under which each of these outcomes materializes.We
begin by examining the possible outcomes of a referendum on migration ignoring, for the
moment, any compensation policies.
5.1. Referendum on Migration
Consider the voting outcome in country A. The proportion of people who would vote in
favor of migration, ’M
A , is equal to
’
M







where the second term captures the votes of the migrants. The median voter￿ s pre-
migration utility is equal to ~ hA(pT)￿￿ while the same voter￿ s post-migration utility is
(p￿)￿v; keeping in mind that in the pre-migration period is employed in sector X and
then moves to sector Y . Equating the two utilities, solving for the median voter￿ s human















Next consider the voting outcome in country B. The proportion of people who would vote
in favor of migration, ’M
B , is equal to
’
M




The proposition below follows from the inequality ’M
B < ’M
A and the fact that both
countries have to vote in favor of migration.
Proposition 3 In the absence of any compensation policy migration will take place if
and only if ’M
B > 0:5.
Also, notice that a decline in migration costs increases the likelihood that the voting
outcome will favor migration.
115.2. Referenda on Migration and Compensation
Suppose that citizens in each country have the opportunity to vote on two referenda. In
one referendum, as in the previous section, they vote on whether or not to allow migration
(emigration in country A and immigration in country B). In the other referendum they
vote on whether or not there will be compensation for those who experience a loss in
income as a result of migration. We demonstrate that outcomes would depend on whether
or not migrants are allowed to vote on the compensation referendum in the host country
(B) and on the sequence of referenda in the source country (A).
We begin with country A. We assume that if the compensation referendum takes place
￿rst the compensation scheme can include a tax on migrants whose revenues can be used
for compensating the losers. The proposition below identi￿es conditions such that the
sequence of referenda matters.




k￿1 ￿ ~ hA > ~ hA. Then country A will vote
for compensation if and only if the migration referendum takes place ￿rst..
Proof The ￿rst inequality states that the winners together with the migrants are a ma-
jority group. The second inequality states that the proportion of losers is higher
than the proportion of winners. Suppose that the compensation referendum takes
place ￿rst. The migrants do not have an incentive to vote for compensation given
that together with the winner will vote in favor of migration. In contrast, when the
migration referendum takes place ￿rst there will be an unaminous vote in favor of
migration. The winners are still better o⁄ and the losers know that they can get
compensation after the next referendum.
Now consider the referenda in country B.
Proposition 5 Suppose that ~ hB + 1 ￿
￿
k￿1 > 1 ￿ ~ hB > ~ hB. Then country B will vote
for compensation if and only if migrants are not allowed to vote on the compensation
referendum.
Proof Clearly, if migrants are allowed to vote on the compensation referendum they would
vote against compensation. The ￿rst inequality states that the winners together with
the migrants are a majority group. The second inequality states that the proportion
of losers is higher than the proportion of winners. Notice that if migrants were
allowed to vote and given that they would vote against compensation there would
be a vote against migration given that the losers (in the absence of migrant vore)
are a majority group.
6. Conclusion
We have presented a two-country model of trade and skilled labor migration. Trade and
migration are induced by di⁄erences in technologies and thus are complements. Cross-
border movements of workers has signi￿cant welfare implications for both source and
12host countries. In our model, where only skilled workers have an incetive to migrate
those workers who are employed in skill-intensive sectors (other than the migrants) su⁄er
welfare losses. Nevertheless, we have shown that, in both countries, the welfare gains
of those workers who ben￿t from migration exceed (in absolute terms) the losses of of
those workers who su⁄er losses. However, we have also shown that in countries where
both migration and any compensation policies are decided by majority vote, there is no
guarantee that neither the loses will be compensated should migration take place nor there
will be a vote in favor of migration.
This framework can be easily extended to account for unskilled worker migration by
having the two countries using di⁄erent technologies for the production of the primary
commodity. For that matter a general version can allow for migration of both types of
workers which can be either in the same or in the opposite direction.10
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Figure 4: International Trade and Migration 
 
 